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Abstract
William D. Hamilton’s impact on contemporary views of evolution has been nothing
short of revolutionary, and his contributions to our reasoning on kin selection, genomic
conflicts, parasitism and costs of sex dominate these fields. He also had an important, if
somewhat less obvious, influence on evolutionary game theory. This field, which by
now is well-established both in biology and economics, is usually (and rightly)
attributed to John Maynard Smith: the canonical references are his brief joint paper with
George Price, and his book ‘Evolution and the Theory of Games’. But W.D. Hamilton
played an important, and indeed pioneering role in the development of this field.
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William D. Hamilton’s impact on contemporary views of evolution has been nothing
short of revolutionary, and his contributions to our reasoning on kin selection, genomic
conflicts, parasitism and costs of sex dominate these fields. He also had an important, if
somewhat less obvious, influence on evolutionary game theory. This field, which by
now is well-established both in biology and economics, is usually (and rightly)
attributed to John Maynard Smith: the canonical references are his brief joint paper with
George Price (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973), and his book ‘Evolution and the Theory
of Games’(Maynard Smith, 1982). But W.D. Hamilton played an important, and indeed
pioneering role in the development of this field.
In the early sixties, game theory was looking back on more than a decade of heady
progress. The seminal book on ‘The theory of Games and Economic Behaviour’ (von
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) had inspired some of the best mathematicians of the
time. It had also fired public imagination and been subject to some of the hype later
lavished on catastrophes and chaos. The response of economists, to whom game theory
was offered as a tool, turned out to be somewhat more guarded. Bill Hamilton had
encountered the book ‘in idle reading’ (as he later wrote, Hamilton 1996) while he was
a student of genetics, and returned to it ‘almost as a leisure distraction’ when he had
landed at the London School of Economics for his doctoral thesis (officially in human
demography). He later wrote that ‘the idea of fitness being treated as equivalent to
‘payoff’ in a biological version of von Neumann’s game theory had crossed my mind as
soon as I read his earliest account’. Hamilton had read also the standard textbook of the
time (Luce and Raiffa 1957), which included the concept of a Nash equilibrium and a
discussion of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
At that time, there had been several attempts to use game theory in evolutionary
biology, most notably a paper by Lewontin (1960) which interpreted life-history traits
as strategies and reproductive success as payoff function, and which showed that the
optimal solution of a certain game ‘against nature’ was a mixed strategy. Another fore-
runner was Verner (1965), who treated sex-ratios as strategies and aimed at showing
that in the presence of fluctuations in the overall sex-ratio, an individual’s 1:1 sex-ratio
was optimal. These early papers did not yet apply game theory to model competition
within a population, and did not even implicitly consider population dynamics.
Decades earlier, both these aspects had been used by R.A. Fisher, Bill Hamilton’s
‘hero of twentieth century evolution’ (Hamilton 1996). Fisher’s argument on sex-ratio
selection (Fisher, 1930) was later couched in terms which made it appear as a paragon
of evolutionary game theory (see e.g. Maynard Smith 1982). But when Fisher first
conceived his argument, he knew nothing about game theory: in fact, in (Fisher, 1934),
he proved from scratch a result about the optimal play in a defunct card-game,
obviously unaware of John von Neumann’s minimax theorem from 1930. Robert
2MacArthur (1965) used an approach similar to Fisher’s in discussing sex-ratios, again
without using concepts from game theory.
Bill Hamilton applied game theory to reveal the essence and the limitations of
Fisher’s argument, and to explain the wide-spread occurrence of extraordinary sex
ratios. This article, which many (including himself) consider as his best paper, appeared
1967 in Science, but it was based on ideas he had already developed by 1963. Hamilton
stressed the ‘unexpectedly close similarity to certain types of situations considered in
the theory of games’ (Hamilton, 1967), first ‘in the sense of a play by the individual
against the population’ (what nowadays is called ‘playing the field’), and then in the
pairwise competition of two parasitoid females laying their eggs in the same host (‘a
refined version [of the model] which is very realistically game-like’). Technically, the
main tool is that of an ‘unbeatable’ strategy. Hamilton did not define it explicitly — in
fact, he only spoke of sex-ratios as being unbeatable, and always in the context of a
specific genetic or phenotypic model. As Hamilton (1996) later stated, the notion
required that no alternative strategy, ‘no matter what starting frequency in a mixture,
would be able to increase.
A few years later, John Maynard Smith introduced the definition of an evolutionarily
stable strategy (or ESS), stressing that it had `been derived in part from the theory of
games, and in part from the work of MacArthur and Hamilton on the evolution of the
‘sex ratio’ (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973). The concept met immediately with
resounding success. In contrast to the ‘unbeatable’ strategy, it only required that an
alternative strategy would not be able to increase when its frequency was low. In fact, it
would be selected against: a rare mutant invading a resident monomorphic population of
ESS-players would be eliminated under the influence of natural selection. This notion
was stronger than that of a Nash equilibrium, but weaker than that of an unbeatable
strategy (and of a strict Nash equilibrium). Roughly speaking, two strategies exposed to
selection can (a) either co-exist in equilibrium in the population, or (b) one can
dominate the other in the sense of always eliminating it from any mixture, or (c) they
can mutually resist invasion by the other. In case (c), that of bistability, both strategies
would be ESSs, but not unbeatable; in case (b), the dominating strategy is unbeatable.
(In a further case (d) of selective neutrality, both strategies have equal success against
each other and against themselves. In many contexts, this case is unlikely. But
overlooking it causes confusion. For instance, both Hamilton (Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981) and Maynard Smith (1982) published proofs of the purported ‘evolutionary
stability’ of the Tit For Tat strategy which, in fact, only showed that it was a Nash
equilibrium).
The notion of ESS is particularly appropriate for large, well-mixed populations, for
in that case any invading mutant is obviously rare. In highly structured populations, this
is not necessarily the case, and it could well be that Hamilton conceived the stronger
condition of unbeatability because he was used to think of viscous populations. But the
main reason why the concept of evolutionary stability spread faster than that of
unbeatability was probably caused, less by its greater generality, than by the fact that it
was introduced in a much more explicit fashion (Maynard Smith, 1974) and in a context
(pairwise conflicts) which was closer to usual examples in game theory. In Hamilton’s
1967 paper, the ‘unbeatability’ concept was almost hidden behind too many other
breakthrough ideas on intragenomic conflicts, levels-of-selection and the cost of sex, all
piling on each other.
3In later papers (Hamilton and May, 1977, and Comins, Hamilton, and May, 1980),
Hamilton used the concept of an ESS and praised its ‘combination of simplicity and
generality’ in helping to define ‘final’ strategies. But it should be stressed that there
exists, by now, a confusing variety of versions of population stability which had all too
often been illegitimately labelled as ESS (for discussions, see Lessard, 1990, and Eshel,
1996). Furthermore, the corresponding equilibria need not always be the ultimate
outcome of evolution (Eshel and Motro, 1981, and Nowak, 1990).
Hamilton was clearly less interested in disentangling strategic and genetic viewpoints
of great generality than in studying concrete examples of applications of game theory to
social behaviour. It was, as he wrote (Hamilton 1996), `a complete surprise to find an
exact evolutionary analogue to one of game theory’s most famous puzzles coming to
light right in the midst of my own work on population genetical dynamics’, namely the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. He first discussed it in the proceedings volume of a symposium
which took place in Washington DC in 1969 (Hamilton, 1971).
In this paper, Hamilton still had to struggle with the fact that game theory
‘presupposes beings to think, and potentially, to communicate’, which implies that ‘in
non-human biology, at least as regards preconsidered strategies, its relevance must be
limited’. The rationality axiom of classical game theory was looming as an obstacle. But
the Prisoner’s Dilemma problem becomes actually easier within the evolutionary
context — though Hamilton adds: ‘I am doubtful whether the findings from natural
selection throw any light on the problem of how it is rational to act’.
Hamilton later referred to this proceedings paper as ‘my first intellectual wild oat’,
and warned the reader of its shortcomings — including, in his own words, ‘lack of focus
and lack of anything new to say’ (Hamilton, 1996). Lack of focus there may be; indeed,
the paper reads, from its opening Nietzsche quotation onwards, like an unbridled
steeple-chase through Bill Hamilton’s brain. But it darts over a vast amount of new
things to say, with utterly original ideas taken up in full gallop and tossed off at the next
turn, including in particular, anticipations of seminal papers by John Maynard Smith,
E.O. Wilson and Robert Trivers that were soon to burst on the scene. In particular, game
theory is almost casually applied to interactions in pairs, payoff-matrices are introduced
in biological context and modified to take account of relatedness, ritualised fighting is
addressed in the context of the group selection debate, and gregarious behaviour as well
as non-random pairing are shown to modify the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Hamilton did not explicitly mention reciprocation in that paper, and neither did he
consider repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games. But the ‘personal communication by
W.D. Hamilton’ which Trivers (1971) quotes as ‘offering a concise reformultation’ of
his own treatment of reciprocal altruism did take place at about that time. It stated that if
the number of repeated interactions is sufficiently high, a very small cluster of altruists
ready to retaliate could invade a population of non-altruists, and take over. This is
arguably the most significant contribution of evolutionary game theory towards
explaining the emergence of cooperation.
A much more disciplined return to some of the topics covered in Hamilton’s ‘wild
oat’ occured in Hamilton’s next paper for conference proceedings (Hamilton 1975). It
dealt squarely with a topic that had been central to Hamilton’s thinking, ever since he
had tried (in vain) to get accepted as a graduate student in a department of social
anthropology: namely the innate social aptitudes of man — a term which, at that time
was tantamount to a declaration of war on the prevailing intellectual climate. It may
4have been in anticipation of the expected backlash that this paper was structured with
particular care.
By 1975, game theory had established a safe bridgehead in the theory of evolution,
and the notion of reciprocal altruism had been resoundingly put forward by Trivers.
Moreover, as a result of his association with Price, Hamilton could deal much more
concisely with the level-of-selection issue in this paper. A game-theoretic aspect of far-
reaching consequence was addressed towards the end of the article. The more players
participate in common good games of the Prisoner’s Dilemma type, the more
opportunities there usually are for defection. Hamilton pointed out that social
enforcement can overcome this problem. This opened an approach which has proved
highly successful since (see e.g. Boyd and Richerson, 1992, and Fehr and Gächter,
1998). In particular, Hamilton describes in concise form a ‘three-person Prisoner’s
Dilemma’: whatever the other two players are doing, a player is always best off
defecting; but if two cooperators join forces to punish the cheater, it no longer pays to
defect unilaterally.
In 1978 Hamilton, who was disappointed by the lack of recognition at London’s
Imperial College, moved to the University of Michigan. In retrospect, it looks almost
inevitable that he should have joined forces with a young professor of political science
working there, Robert Axelrod, who was at the time running a spectacular series of
computer tournaments on the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, soon to be published in the
Journal of Conflict Resolution (Axelrod, 1980). Hamilton quickly grasped the
importance of what Axelrod termed ‘the shadow of the future’(the probability of a
further round of the game), and of the huge diversity of mechanisms — discrimination,
territoriality etc — for extending this shadow. In particular, he suggested that in
symbiotic associations, enfeeblement of the host (caused, for instant, by ageing or
illness) can act as a signal that the association will end, and result in an increase of
virulence: symbionts turn parasites. Other applications were found within the field of
intra-genomic conflict, the earliest of Hamilton’s scientific obsessions.
The outcome of the collaboration between Axelrod and Hamilton was the now-
classical paper on ‘The Evolution of Cooperation’ (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981) which
won the Newcomb-Cleveland Prize of the American Association for the Advancement
of Science. It contained relatively little that had not already been derived by one or the
other of the two authors. But simply putting it together made a spectacularly convincing
case for the importance of reciprocal altruism, and spawned what Richard Dawkins, in a
foreword to a later edition of Axelrod’s book, termed ‘a whole new research industry’
with many hundreds of papers (see e.g. Dugatkin, 1997). Since Hamilton was, almost by
constitution, inclined to choose the opposite of the majority strategy, this success may
have been a reason for him not to return to evolutionary game theory in his later years.
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